you what you have to do. So I decided to stay home basically because I would feel really stupid and rude telling my cousin, well, I'm not going to be there. And I did have a really good time Choice A at her graduation party, but I was kind of thinking I could be in Ohio right now. (Fischhoff, Furby, Quadrel, & Richardson, In this task, you will be asked to choose between a certain loss 1991) and a gamble that exposes you to some chance of loss. Specifically, you must choose either: Situation A. One chance in 4 to
The first of these choices looks like the kind of tidy lose $200 (and 3 chances in 4 to lose nothing). OR Situation B.
stimulus found in many studies of behavioral decision A certain loss of $50. Of course, you'd probably prefer not to be making. The second looks like the kind of messy process in either of these situations, but, if forced to either play the gamble (A) or accept the certain loss (B), which would you prefer found in many people's minds, when they try to grapple to do? (Fischhoff, Slovic, & Lichtenstein, 1980) with what life sends their way. Our goal in studying choices like A is to illuminate situations like B. A nagChoice B ging worry has to be whether you can get there from There are good reasons for studying A, rather than but my friend-she used to live here and we went to . . . like B. So much is going on in B that it is hard to tell which started preschool together, you know. And then in 7th grade her factors influence behavior. Choice B is so unique that one cannot say how people generally behave in such
Talks developing the ideas in this article were given as colloquia situations, at least without grappling with what ''such at Princeton, Rice, Carnegie Mellon, and New York Universities, and situations'' means. The richness of Choice B comes as a Presidential Address to the Society for Judgment and Decision through the filter of verbal reports, which can add both Making. The comments of those audiences are gratefully apprecirandom and systematic error (e.g., Ericsson & Simon, ated, as are the contributions of the co-authors and investigators 1984; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977) . Observing Choice B in cited here. Shane Frederick, Gideon Keren, Ola Svenson, and an anonymous reviewer provided valuable comments on a draft of this vivo, and even eliciting concurrent verbal protocols, manuscript. Its preparation was supported by the National Institute might reduce these problems at the price of incurring on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism and the National Science Founda-others (e.g., influencing decision makers' behavior).
tion. The opinions expressed are, of course, those of the author. Ad-
Content
unlikely to generate alternative frames independently (Hogarth, 1982; Kahneman & Tversky, 1984; Thaler, Those who study decision making in general often 1985) . More open-ended procedures may clarify which have relatively little interest in the topics of everyday frames people adopt spontaneously  decisions. Their primary concern is processes that Frisch, 1993) . Thus, teens concerned about relations with emerge across domains. It would be a diversion for friends may not even think about how those choices affect them to develop a theory of context, characterizing deci-subsequent decisions about smoking or sex. sion topics and examining their effects on thought proSome of the most effective programs for reducing cesses.
2 One aspect of content that sometimes does ap-teen risk behaviors might be seen as attempts to elimipear in theoretical discussions is familiarity. Perfor-nate such framing effects. These programs train teens mance may improve if familiarity provides fluency with in the cognitive skills needed to understand decisions the issues, making it easier to focus on task structure. and in the social skills needed to implement choices, by Or, familiarity may reduce performance, if it encour-withstanding pressure to take unwise actions (Baron & ages habitual responses, leading people to ignore task Brown, 1991; Botvin, 1983; Dryfoos, 1990) . Unfortustructure. Familiarity may also affect the vocabulary nately, the empirical evaluations of these complex infor discussing a domain, perhaps stabilizing usage, per-terventions reveal little about how they affect teens' haps leading to the divergence found in a living lan-decision-making processes en route to influencing their guage. Unrecognized differences in usage can produce behaviors (Beyth-Marom et al., 1991) . tasks that mislead subjects and responses that mislead investigators. People should have better elaborated be-Structure liefs about topics that are on their minds. They may also have more accurate beliefs, if they have had the We used several coding schemes to ask whether opportunity to learn. Thus, how people speak can illu-the decisions described by teens had the structure minate the experiences that they have had.
assumed by decision theory: distinct options, clear In order to find out what topics were on these teens' consequences, and intervening uncertainties -as minds, we asked them to describe briefly recent deci-well as what forms these components take. sions in each of seven domains (school, free time, clothing, friendships, health, money, and parents). They had
Options. The introductory segments of the interview defined decisions as choices among two or more no trouble doing so, producing 17.4 decisions per subject. The largest category of these decisions dealt with options and saw that subjects could produce suitable examples. The decisions that subjects subsequently friendships (4.6), while very few concerned the sort of fateful issues that concern parents and educators (e.g., produced, however, typically focused on a single option.
Indeed, the largest category of decisions (about 45%) drugs, sex, violence, alcohol). Such ''risk behaviors'' were, however, somewhat more common when the involved statements of resolve, like ''eat more healthfully'' or ''stop blaming others.'' In effect, they expressed teens later described three hard decisions in detail. The most common topic of hard decisions was openness the decision to stick with a previous choice, which might or might not have been implemented. These dewith friends, followed, at some distance, by openness with parents, drugs, career plans, and school perfor-scriptions leave the alternative options unstated. Explicit alternatives were also absent from the next most mance.
Of course, these domains are not independent. For ex-common category (20% of descriptions), involving decisions about whether to do something (e.g., smoke cigaample, relations with friends, parents, and teachers shape and are shaped by decisions about drugs. Our sub-rettes). Roughly equal numbers of decisions (about 15%) described two distinct options (e.g., whether to go jects' reports suggest that health-risk issues emerge sequentially, after other decisions have been made. Experi-to school or hang out with friends) or a set of options that seemed to have been identified, even if it was not mental research has demonstrated predictable differences in people's choices when decisions are framed in described completely (e.g., which class to take, what to wear, with whom to have lunch). Very few decisions simultaneous or sequential form; moreover, people are (5%) involved seeking or ''designing'' options (e.g., how to spend my free time, what to do about having fought a Includes cases where respondents produced no answer or an uncodable one, or where the question was not asked due to a procedural error. These three cases constituted 27, 51, and 21% of missing responses, respectively.
Source: Fischhoff, Furby, Quadrel & Richardson (1991) .
cially with the pending decisions, which were seldom Breadth. Decisions might be arranged along a continuum from tactical, one-time decisions regarding spedescribed in terms of decisions ''to do X''). The hard decisions were also more likely to involve two distinct cific limited choices to strategic decisions, setting longterm, relatively irreversible policies. In order to see options, rather than a set of possibilities. These results, and others, appear in Table 1. whether teens address policy issues spontaneously, we categorized their descriptions into (a) concrete choices, These descriptions suggested some additional underlying mechanisms: (a) These teens rarely described regarding specific situations; (b) limited policies, regarding a single repeated decision (e.g., ride my horse their past decisions as having offered the possibility of creating new options, which might have gotten them every day); (c) limited policies, regarding multiple decisions (e.g., save money for horse equipment); (d) genout of difficult spots. (b) The chance to create options was more common with pending hard choices (sug-eral policies, with broad principles governing diverse circumstances (e.g., take better care of myself). gesting that behavior looks more constrained in hindsight than in foresight). (c) Subjects' hard decisions
The vast majority of all decisions involved concrete, one-time choices. This was even more true for the de-(like Choice B) were somewhat more likely to involve two clear options. (d) The more decisions that a subject tailed hard decisions than for the briefly described recent decisions (about 85% vs 75%). The clearest excepdescribed, the more likely those decisions were to be statements of resolve.
tion was decisions about health and money, 48 and 36% of which involved limited policies (e.g., what sort of diet If these descriptions and our coding capture subjects' everyday thinking, then their decision making focuses or spending pattern to adopt). It is not hard to imagine general policy choices in the other areas (e.g., how to on the acceptance or rejection of a single option, or even just the reiteration of a previous choice. Paying undue spend free time, what to do about homework, how to keep parents off one's back). However, they were rarely attention to a focal option is seen in several phenomena demonstrated in laboratory experiments. These in-produced. Although hard decisions provide an opportunity to reflect about the long term, it was not one that clude neglect of opportunity costs, overemphasis of sunk costs, and various confirmation biases (e.g., these teens seized.
In such situations, tactical situations add up to gen- Dawes, 1988; Fischhoff & Beyth-Marom, 1983; Klayman & Ha, 1987; Thaler, 1980 Thaler, , 1985 . If people think eral policies. For example, each decision about doing homework (or hanging out with the crowd) partially the way they talk, then our subjects' descriptions suggest that such phenomena are not only possible, but defines a teen's policies regarding schoolwork and responsibility (among other things). If one-time and recommon. peated choices are made differently (Keren & Wagen-tion. Similarly, the difficulty of their current hard decisions was attributed much more often to both options aar, 1987), then results from single-choice experiments may be most pertinent to predicting real-world behav-having negative features than to both having positive features. ior, in situations that could be construed either way.
Subjects seldom mentioned uncertainty as a major Consequences and uncertainties. Subjects chose one source of difficulty, even though they had produced unof their two past hard decisions for a fuller and more certain consequences in response to a previous quesdirected description. Among other things, they were tion. Subjects never mentioned some potential reasons asked to list six kinds of consequences. The first was that we had included in our coding scheme because ''good things that you were certain would happen to you they are often mentioned as sources of decision-making if you made that choice.'' Subsequent requests dealt, in difficulty: complexity (many options to choose from, order, with uncertain good things, certain bad things, many consequences to consider), time pressure, and uncertain bad things, good things given up by making personal inability to make decisions or make changes. that choice, and bad things avoided by making that In this light, either these are not the factors that make choice. The last two categories were called indirect con-decisions difficult or people do not recognize their insequences. Such open-ended, but directive questions fluence. show how subjects can think about these issues, an A subsequent question asked ''what did you think indirect indicator of how they actually do.
about while making the decision?'' It produced three On average, subjects produced two good conse-issues on average. Similar patterns emerged (e.g., a quences of their chosen option, and one consequence focus on negative and concrete consequences). One difin each other category. Three times as many subjects ference was greater reference to uncertainty. However, produced no certain bad consequence as produced no it typically concerned how an event would be expericertain good one (27% vs 9%). Most subjects produced enced (e.g., ''what would it be like if I went to live with at least one good and one bad uncertain consequence my mother'' or ''went to the other school''), rather than (84%, 80%), indicating that they could think about un-whether something would happen. certainty-if asked explicitly. Despite the direct query, What did you do to help you think about your deciquite a few subjects produced no indirect consequences, sion? For about one third of their past decisions, subeither good ones given up by the choice or bad ones jects reported doing nothing. Most of the remaining avoided by it (29%, 30%). Here, too, there is confirmacases involved various ways of focusing their thinking tion of experimental results, showing the difficulty of or seeking information and support. Those who sought thinking up opportunity costs, even when asked explichelp went to friends and parents. A few subjects reitly. This reduced sensitivity to indirect consequences ported trying not to think. Even fewer reported reading applied equally to avoided costs and forgone benefits.
something. Subjects were much more likely to report active reProcess sponses (beyond just thinking) for their current hard We did not observe these decisions being made. Even decisions, with a particular tendency to experimentafor the pending hard decisions, we got only a mid-tion. Trying out different options (e.g., ways of dealing stream selection of issues. As a result, we also asked with parents) can reduce cognitive load (by acting out subjects to describe their decision-making processes. possibilities) and reduce uncertainty (by seeing how These descriptions are vulnerable to various biases actions work and feel). Current experiments may be (e.g., flawed introspection, self-serving biases). Even more visible than past ones because many plans do so, they may have a life of their own, if they reflect the not actually get carried out. Thus, past decisions may stories that people tell themselves, about their decision provide better indicators of which experiments they get making.
around to trying.
Do you wish that you had made a different choice? What made this a hard decision?
Subjects produced two reasons, on average, for each of their three hard Only 15-20% of subjects said that they did. Their primary reason was not liking the option that they had decisions. For the two past decisions, the most common concern was negative aspects of the chosen option, fol-selected, rather than wishing that they had taken the rejected option. Those who expressed no regret were lowed by negative features of the rejected option. They seldom mentioned positive features of either the chosen also twice as likely to mention good aspects of what they had chosen, rather than bad aspects of what they option or a rejected one (i.e., opportunity costs). Thus, they emphasized loss avoidance over benefit maximiza-had rejected. The lack of regret may reflect which hard decisions subjects chose to describe, how well those de-worked topics. However, it produces such diverse decisions that only general, structural analyses are possicisions were made, or how they were reinterpreted in retrospect. These descriptions suggest a less balanced ble. It is difficult to study how people deal with the substance of particular domains. The following sections analysis of competing alternatives than that appearing in regret theories (Loomes & Sugden, 1983) .
consider some possibilities for an open-ended focus on specific components of decisions. In response to other questions: (a) Subjects saw themselves as working about as hard as their peers at decision making. (b) Some 39% saw themselves as Uncertainties equally good decision makers. Those who made a dis-A natural question in considering teens' (or anyone tinction were twice as likely to describe themselves as else's) decisions about risks is how well they underbetter than average decision makers than as worse stand the size of those risks. Our literature review (42% vs 18%). (c) Individual differences in the difficulty found many surveys of adolescents' risk perceptions. of making decisions were attributed to the circumHowever, few had questions formulated precisely stances that teens faced and the social support that enough for the accuracy of the answers to be evaluated. they enjoyed, rather than to personal characteristics.
As might be expected, most tasks used verbal quantifiThese beliefs contrast with the popular notion that ers (e.g., likely, rarely), whose ambiguity is well known teens view themselves as unique and invulnerable (e.g., (Lichtenstein & Newman, 1967; Merz, Druzdzel, & MaElkind, 1967; . They suggest resiszur, 1991; Wallsten, Budescu, Rapoport, Zwick, & Fortance to the fundamental attribution error (Nisbett & syth, 1986) . Thus, these investigators had not yet be- Ross, 1980) . gun to deal with the difficulties of eliciting quantitative estimates in unfamiliar units (Fischhoff & MacGregor, Summary 1983 ; Lichtenstein, Slovic, Fischhoff, Layman, & Taken at their word, these teens emerge as active, Poulton, 1989) . absorbed decision makers. After minimal instruction, Less expected was the discovery of similar ambiguity they produced many examples of decisions in their in the descriptions of the risks being judged. Even had lives. Their descriptions were sufficiently clear that we a precise response mode been used, the accuracy of could code them from a variety of decision theoretic those answers still could hardly be evaluated. Table 2 perspectives. The teens seemed eager to discuss their shows two questions from a large-sample survey, spondecisions and, as in Choice B, recognized their complex-sored by the National Center for Health Statistics of ity. Nonetheless, their descriptions showed some poten-the Centers for Disease Control. Following each questial problems. The focus on single options is reminis-tion are alternative definitions of the quantity and incent of several phenomena in the literature (e.g., ne-tensity of that kind of risk behavior. If one believed glect of opportunity costs), while the focus on negative that these exposures create any risk at all, then the consequences might be a corollary of loss aversion. The magnitude of that risk would depend on what one inlimited references to uncertainty about what will hap-ferred about these unspecified elements of the definipen contrast with the focus on probability assessment tion (among others). Subjects' risk judgments could be in decision-making research. It might also provide interpreted only if all subjects made the inferencesweak general support for research showing problems which investigators were then able to guess. The numwith probability judgments, assuming that people do bers in parentheses indicate the percentage of subjects poorly at tasks that attract little of their attention. who endorsed each alternative interpretation, after References to uncertainty centered on what (relatively having answered the question on a previous page. certain) outcomes would be like. Understanding those These subjects were drawn from a relatively homogeuncertainties requires studying how people predict neous population (juniors at an Ivy League college) The their tastes, how confident they are in those predic-range of opinion shows some of the ambiguity in these tions, and how they resolve uncertain preferences questions and some of these students' linguistic norms Frisch, Jones & O'Brien, 1994 ; Kahne-and mental models. man, in press; Loewenstein, in press).
The options in Table 2 were the investigators' own invention. Suggesting them might have artificially put some ideas in subjects' minds, while neglecting other
COMPONENTS OF DECISIONS
ideas that were already these (thereby exaggerating or understating the degree of ambiguity). Quadrel (1990;  Letting people discuss whatever decisions are on their minds allows them to speak about relatively well -Quadrel, Fischhoff, & Palmgren, 1994 ) adopted a more Note. Entries are the percentage of subjects (in a sample of 135 students at an Ivy League college) who reported having inferred each definition of the phrase when they had answered a question about the risk that it entailed. The response mode comprised five verbal quantifiers: definitely not possible, very unlikely, somewhat unlikely, somewhat likely, and very likely.
Source: .
open-ended strategy: having teens think aloud as they highly specified questions. Subjects there were most responsive to those factors that had been cited most answered risk-estimation questions that were deliberately ambiguous (at about the level of typical surveys). frequently as relevant in the open-ended study.
Methodologically, these results suggest that wellFor example, ''What is the probability that a person will have an accident while drinking and driving?'' or specified questions are both needed and possible. Substantively, they suggest that teens have fairly robust ''What is the probability that a person will get AIDS from having sex with someone who has AIDS?'' Sub-intuitive theories regarding these risks, which emerge similarly in different tasks. The content of those beliefs jects were drawn from both low-risk settings (e.g., suburban high school teams and clubs) and high-risk ones suggest how they have processed past experiences with these risks and how they might make future decisions (e.g., treatment homes). Table 3 shows the coding framework for the risk fac-about them. For example, most subjects spontaneously discussed the frequency of most risk behaviors, indicattors that subjects produced, illustrated with examples from the drinking-and-driving question. Data analyses ing the salience of dose-response relationships. However, they did not ask about the frequency of sex as a showed great variation in subjects' assumptions about the unstated elements of these risks (e.g., how much determinant of the risks of pregnancy and of AIDS.
These particular results provide an additional perdriving, what kind of driving, how serious an accident). As a result, these subjects were effectively answering spective on a recurrent topic in experimental studies:
how people estimate the cumulative probability of comdifferent questions from one another and from any investigator's expectations. In these domains at least, it pound events (e.g., Bar-Hillel, 1974; Cohen, Chesnick & Haran, 1971; Keren, 1990) . In structured tasks, we have may be hard to learn very much about risk judgments without much sharper questions and answers. A follow-observed particularly large underestimation of how quickly risks mount up through repeated sexual expoup experiment varied individual risk factors within Quadrel, Fischhoff & Palmgren (1996). sures (Linville, Fischer, & Fischhoff, 1993; Shaklee & Consequences Fischhoff, 1990 ).
The present, open-ended results sug-A focal argument in youth policy is whether informagest that the idea of cumulative risk does not even occur tion ''works'' with adolescents. If education does not to many people in this domain (Luker, 1975) . If an issue influence teen decision making, then there is a stronger does not arise naturally, then people may do particularly case for implementing coercive policies. One approach poorly when asked to address it. There are many studies to determining the role of information in teen decisions of intuitive beliefs in specific domains (e.g., Chi, Glahas been to predict those decisions as a linear function ser & Farr, 1988; Furnham, 1988; Leventhal & Cam- of the judged attractiveness of a preselected set of coneron, 1987; Morgan, 1993) . Behavioral decision making sequences, weighted by their judged likelihood. The might exploit them to identify and to understand the properties of the topics it happens to use for stimuli.
moderate success of such models (e.g., Bauman, 1980; Bauman, Fisher & Koch, 1988) 
In terms of the policy debates that motivated them, behavioral decision-making research, that many these studies show teens as having a higher capacity weighting schemes will provide somewhat successful for cognitive performance than one might have expredictions, as long as the consequences span the space pected. They also suggest some specifics on how to comof relevant concerns-or are correlated to ones that do municate best with teens. These two issues are interre- (Camerer, 1981; Dawes & Corrigan, 1974; Goldberg, lated. Poorly designed communications erode faith in 1968). The price for these practical successes is diffiteens, by making them responsible for our failures to culty in distinguishing alternative specifications and, speak clearly (we knew what we meant, why didn't hence, in gaining much insight into cognitive processes they listen?). If teens are seen as cognitively competent, (Hoffman, 1960) .
then there is more place for providing them with the In order to gain some additional purchase on which sophisticated information needed for effective decision consequences matter to teens, we asked some teens to making, addressing the values that make them willlist the ''things that might happen'' if they accepted fully choose behaviors that adults deplore, and alleviat-(or declined) opportunities to engage in six potentially ing circumstances that restrict their ability to act marisky behaviors (e.g., driving with a friend who has turely. been drinking, skipping school to go to a mall) (BeythMarom, Austin, Fischhoff, Quadrel & Palmgren, 1993) . Options We found very similar responses in matched groups of If only one thing is standardized in a structured adults and adolescents, drawn from low-risk settings. study, it is likely to be the options. Life, however, does In addition to sharing beliefs about these possibilities, not always provide ordered sets of options. Indeed, these teens and adults were equally sensitive to how some of the few studies of option generation have their task was formulated. Although accepting and de-shown sensitivity to just how the tasks are posed by clining a risky opportunity are logically complementary investigators (Gettys et al., 1987) . The differences beactions, they were not psychologically complementary. tween the perceived consequences of accepting and reFor example, engaging in a risk behavior generated jecting a risk behavior (Beyth-Marom et al., 1993) sugmore consequences overall than did avoiding it, but gest that an option need not even evoke its complement. fewer indirect consequences (i.e., ones that do not occur Some years ago, Lita Furby and I became interested as a result of the choice). Accepting a risky option pro-in the confident, universal, and contradictory advice duced four times as many bad consequences as good being offered to women, regarding how to reduce the ones; however, rejecting it produced equal numbers of risk of sexual assault (Morgan, 1986) . Even if well ingood and bad consequences. Subjects saw rejecting a tended, such advice can do women a serious disservice. risk as eroding their social standing much more than Not only can it lead to ill-advised actions, but unthey saw accepting a risk as securing social approval. founded advice can increase the blame placed on those Another kind of sensitivity to question framing was women whose chosen options do not succeed-because that the prospect of repeatedly engaging in a risk be-whatever they did was against the advice of some selfhavior evoked many more bad consequences than did styled experts. Universal advice can misdirect women doing it just once. who do not accept its underlying trade-offs. These results suggest general decision-making proAs part of a systematic look at this advice and the cesses. For example, one might infer that action and evidence supporting it , we examined inaction evoke quite different perspectives, as do short-the scope, organization, and formulation of options term and long-term time perspectives. Without explicit among both experts and laypeople. In the advice literaprompts, thinking about one perspective does not in-ture, we found that options are often lumped into voke the other. These results also elaborate or qualify coarse categories with loaded labels, like active and conclusions reached in studies using structured meth-passive.
3 In order to understand lay perceptions, we ods. For example, they show another context within
posed a series of open-ended questions asking what a
The messiness of these options contrasts with the apparent simplicity of the few (perhaps two) well-dewoman could do to protect herself in various circumstances (Furby, Fischhoff, & Morgan, 1990) . Our sub-fined options offered in many lab experiments. However, the simplicity of the options in experiments belies jects were 43-45 women drawn from each of three populations, students, middle-aged alumna of the same the complexity of the underlying option space. The options are often selected from an uncountable space of university, and working-class young mothers. Each woman produced 26 options on average. Although this possibilities by a deliberately inscrutable procedure.
(If subjects knew how stimuli were derived, then they is a large number of strategies for an individual to write on an open-ended questionnaire, it is still less than a might discern the purpose of the study and provide artifactually orderly responses). There may be value tenth of the 300-plus different options produced by each group as a whole. 4 to studying how the nature of outcome spaces affects people's thinking. For example, do people draw on difWe supplemented this list of options with ones produced by a group of men and a national sample of sex-ferent skills for arbitrarily created tasks and for messily specified ones? If so, then the generality of behavior ual assault experts, and additional ones found in a sample of 50 publications written for lay or professional observed with artificial stimuli might depend on their underlying outcome space (Evans, 1986; Hammond, audiences. In total, we found over 1100 different options. This is a bewildering number of possibilities for 1966; Hogarth, 1981) . women or researchers to consider in any detail. In order to bring some order to this welter of options, we created
WHOLE DECISION STRATEGIES II:
TRANSACTION ANALYSIS a ''strategy grammar.'' In it, each strategy was described in the form, ''Doing action X in order to achieve
Contingent Valuation intended effect Y [which is believed to reduce the risk of rape].'' The typology distinguishes further between
According to Executive Order 12291 (Bentkover, Cothe stage of an assault at which a strategy is directed vello, & Mumpower, 1985) , cost-benefit analyses must (preventing an assault from occurring, preparing to re-be conducted for all significant federal actions. Where act to an assault, or defending oneself during an as-those actions affect the environment, that often means sault) and the level of action involved (individual or putting a price tag on goods not traded in any marketsocietal).
place. These goods include such ''intangible'' effects as In this view, a strategy may be ineffective either be-changes in genetic diversity, visibility at national cause it fails to produce the intended effect or because parks, and discomfort (due to increased tropospheric that effect does not deter sexual assaults. Making that ozone). distinction might help researchers to understand the Fearing the neglect of these effects, some resource effects of strategies (by looking separately at the two economists have resorted to asking respondents for dolcontingencies). Indeed, this categorization revealed a lar equivalents. They call their family of procedures moderately consistent pattern in the otherwise confus-''contingent valuation'' mechanisms, requiring particiing results from studies of the effectiveness of assault pants to act as if a market existed for the environmenprevention strategies (Furby & Fischhoff, in press ). tal change. These investigators have soldiered on for Making that distinction might help women to generate 15 or more years, despite membership in a profession options by prompting the search for ways to achieve with little faith in ''expressed preferences'' (Mitchell & these ends (Pitz, Sachs & Heerboth, 1980) . Table 4 Carson , 1989; Portney, 1994) . Recently, they have shows the most commonly mentioned strategies, for achieved some notable institutional successes: a panel what women can do if assaulted (Stage III). All are of (more and less) disinterested scholars, convened by individual level actions for situations where societal NOAA (1994), has issued a cautious endorsement. Conaction has failed. The details in the table suggest the tingent valuation results influenced the monetary differing experiences of laymen, women, and experts. value of the Exxon Valdez settlement (to the extent Responses of the three groups of women were remark-that science played any role at all). 5 ably similar and are combined here.
A great attraction of contingent valuation is that it allows investigators to pose questions about anything 4 Options were coded as ''different'' if we could see how women that interests them. However, this flexibility exacts a might view them as having different probabilities of producing a set of focal consequences. Those consequences were the ones mentioned 5 In the interests of disclosure, I was a consultant to the Departmost frequently in another study, asking similar women to list important ones (Furby et al., 1991) . ment of Justice in this case. Use Mace, tear gas and chemical 16.7 15.9 (11/13) 11.6 (28/32) sprays a Strategies mentioned by at least 10% of respondents in each groups, in answer to questions R and S (females) or R (males and experts). See Furby, Fischhoff, and Morgan (1990) for verbatim questions. A difference of approximately 20% between females and either of the other groups is significant at p õ .01.
b Stage codes: I, prevent assault from occurring; II, prepare for reacting to an assault; III, defend yourself during a assault. Action level codes: s, societal action; i, individual action. Intended effect subscripts: p, perceived; a, actual. See Fischhoff, Furby, and Morgan (1990) .
c Tied ranks are indicated by giving the range of ranks that are tied (e.g., 8/10 means that there were three strategies all mentioned with the same frequency and thus tied for the 8th, 9th, and 10th slots).
Source : Furby, Fischhoff, & Morgan (1992) .
price. Because they can be asked anything, respon-another felt that the same detail went without saying. It seemed as though the analysis of existing markets, dents can take nothing for granted. As a result, investigators must first convey the complex details of a CV the customary task of economics, had not shown how to create new (contingent) ones. question and, then, allow respondents to articulate stable preferences. Many critics have worried about the In response, we created a framework, identifying the details required in a well-specified ''transaction'' cognitive demands imposed on CV respondents (e.g., Baron, 1994; Diamond & Hausman, 1994; Fischhoff, (Fischhoff & Furby, 1988) . It distinguished the good being offered, the payment being requested, and the 1988, 1991; Kahneman & Knetsch, 1992; Schkade & Payne, 1994) .
social context within which the proposed transaction would be conducted. The good and payment have subAfter reviewing the contingent valuation studies in a single domain (atmospheric visibility), Lita Furby and I stantive properties, representing features that one might care about, and formal properties, defining the settled on a rather different concern: that the intellectual demands of these tasks had overwhelmed the theo-magnitude of those features (which should matter if one cares about them). For example, a substantive retical capacity of economics. We found enormous variability in task specification across studies, without property of visibility is haze; its formal properties include the area and time over which a change would be clear guidelines for its resolution. Details emphasized by one investigator were often ignored entirely by an-experienced, as well as its probability of being achieved as promised. The social context includes what preceother. Where one scientist feared misinterpretation, dents would be set, who legitimates the proposed trans-is extracted). This is a substantive issue, which might action, and who else is being asked.
be expressed along the lines of ''people don't like certain CV investigators typically have little interest in most losses, but do protect themselves when insurance is of these details, caring only about a few focal features. offered.'' If true, this would mean that people use propoHowever, there is no guarantee that omitted details sitional rules, about how to behave in particular conwill not be imputed by respondents, who need to as-texts, in addition to analytical rules, for aggregating sume something in order to make the task meaningful. vectors of dollars and probabilities. Of course, respondents may be insensitive to these Although brief, these choice descriptions do make omissions and to much of what is included. Indeed, several other features explicit. For example, both the they may be content to give a general response to a good and the payment are in dollars; the choices are general question. Such ''gist'' responses may be the best single-play, allowing no ''iterations'' (with opportunipredictors of behavior in situations with low involve-ties to learn from experience or to have outcomes even ment. Unfortunately, CV studies require a much out); the probabilities of the risk (.25) and the promised deeper level of processing: monetary evaluations for protection (1.0) are given. A single question mark indiprecisely described goods.
cates a missing feature that subjects might have imOne obvious way to examine depth of processing is puted, but probably did so similarly for both choices. with manipulation checks, asking respondents how For example, the hypotheticality might have influenced they interpreted their task. Recently, we quizzed peo-subjects' interpretations of these probabilities. Our inple about the details of a brief evaluation task, asking terpretation of the different preferences for the two about a river cleanup, which we had just read them choices need not change if subjects made similar over the phone . Many had forgot-guesses about these features, even if we do not know ten (or never believed) essential details in our descrip-what those guesses are. tion, such as the extent of the cleanup, the likelihood Life is more complicated if subjects made different of it actually being provided, and who else might pay. assumptions in the two conditions. In that case, we do Their evaluations were more consistent when interpre-not know what questions subjects answered nor why ted in terms of the task that they reported having an-they answered differently. Double question marks indiswered, rather than the one that we had posed.
cate such cases. For example, the source of the threatened $200 loss may seem different when insurance is Insurance Decisions available than when a certain loss will avert it. If the source of a loss matters, then inferences about this Our constructive criticism has had some effect on CV missing detail may influence choices. While the context practice (Pommerehne & Schwartz, 1995) . It has also (premium/sure loss) may have been the cue to these forced us to look again at the missing details in our inferences, it would be an incomplete explanation of own experimental tasks. Ones like Choice A require subjects' differential desire for these two kinds of proconveying many fewer details. On the other hand, such tection. tasks leave subjects much greater latitude to read beThe same could be said for possibly different intertween the lines, because there are so many more details pretations of the unstated social context features: who whose omission they might notice. This is, in fact, the provides the coverage (and is party to the contract), same freedom of interpretation that we exploit when what constraints are there on possible offers (and opextrapolating lab results to the real world. Because we portunities to take advantage of subjects), what precehave said so little, we have great freedom in making dents are being set (relative to subjects' self-concept or claims about what in the world looks like our tasks.
their relationship with the coverage provider), and Table 5 characterizes Choice A in terms of some elewhat social norms might legitimate (or proscribe) such ments in the framework that we developed for contina deal. If they affect choices, these interpretations gent valuation. It performs the same analysis for a would elaborate the psychology of ''certain loss'' and second choice problem, identical to A, except that ''cer-''premium.'' They would provide a basis for linking this tain loss'' is replaced by ''insurance premium.'' Alpreference reversal to the complex settings within though the stakes are the same in the two problems, which decisions about protective behavior are actually respondents are much more risk averse with the insurmade. ance formulation (Fischhoff, Slovic, & Lichtenstein, A framework is not a theory. However, it can identify 1980; Hershey & Schoemaker, 1980) . issues that may warrant theorizing and might be studWe attributed this difference to one feature in the framework, the payment context (i.e., how the money ied across contexts. Thus, one might examine people's sensitivity to the probability of actually receiving a basic researchers might adopt the more modest objecpromised good, to which other people observe their tive of making their results available to those better choice, or to the schedule for making payments. Insofar situated to acting on them. Unfortunately, providing as these issues have been studied in their own right, that access requires considerable repetition. The same one could then exploit the relevant chapters in psychol-message needs to be delivered in person and in writing ogy, economics, or sociology. Doing so might inform a to a variety of practitioner audiences, tailored to the general theory of context and limit speculations about circumstances and language of each. They may even the boundary conditions on individual studies. want to meet and query the individual behind the words. Considerable tending is needed to ensure that CONCLUSION the message is heard consistently, in a world where it is convenient to believe one thing or another about huIs This Science Good for the Real World? man behavior . A more modest interim aspiration is to clarify bits of Although designed with real-world problems in the long path between the abstractions of the lab and mind, these studies are still quite a ways from improvthe messiness of the world. Doing so might help basic ing people's lives. Creating workable interventions reresearchers take responsible steps toward practicality, quires detailed design work, followed by rigorous emwithout promoting lab results too quickly and confipirical evaluation. Baron and Brown (1991) show the dently. It might help practitioners refine existing prowork needed for one form of intervention, training in grams whose cognitive components are underdeveldecision making (see also Beyth-Marom et al., 1985) .
oped. As mentioned, adults often despair of teens (just Once proven, an intervention must be sold to those as technical experts often despair of laypeople) for docontrolling access to applied settings (e.g., school ading the wrong things ''despite being told the facts.'' Yet, ministrators, federal regulators, police officials).
the telling is often conducted with little attention to These activities require a focus, a work rhythm, and what people need to know, what they know already, a skill set quite different than those for managing basic research programs. Rather than retooling themselves, how they interpret messages, and how they process information-not to mention how they might legiti-Is the Real World Good for This Science? mately extract different conclusions from the same set It is difficult to study simultaneously how people perof facts (Fischhoff, Bostrom, & Quadrel, 1993 ; Merz ceive the world and what they do with those percepet al., 1993) . The research record shows how we have tions. A standard strategy in cognitive psychology is discovered these issues and partial solutions, in our to standardize the stimuli, so as to gain access to the communications with subjects.
process. In this light, subjects become something like If I were to speculate about the greatest real-world battery-raised hens, placed in very similar environimpact of this research, I would place it in this area.
ments, in hopes of achieving very similar outcomes. Beliefs about competence are important insofar as
The complex intervening processes are clarified whenmore competent people are afforded greater autonomy.
ever changes in individual input factors (e.g., temperaDecision-making research has sometimes been funded ture, crowding, diet) produce predictable changes in by authorities hoping that psychologists could ''do outputs. something'' about a problematic group of people (e.g., With poultry, this strategy leads to harsh practices. citizens who dislike a technology, adolescents who take For example, the destabilization of normal social relahealth risks). Two early, and oft-repeated, research tions may prompt trimming chicken's beaks or putting messages have been: (a) it takes systematic evidence on little red spectacles, in order to keep them from (and not just anecdotal observation) to make responsipecking one another. Although psychologists are preble statements about others' behavior; and (b) both exvented (by ethics and regulations) from abusing subperts and laypeople show complex patterns of strengths jects with strange procedures, we are not protected and weaknesses (Fischhoff, 1977 from deluding ourselves. Live with a task long enough Slovic, & Lichtenstein, 1983; . I and it may become more real than the setting from think that these efforts have contributed to a more which it was abstracted. mutually respectful atmosphere, in arenas where there Tasks like Choice A run the risk of what might be are strong incentives to bash the public (and to distrust called the ''curse of context'': We would like to interpret the experts) (National Research Council, 1989) .
responses as reflecting deep-seated values, of the sort It is, of course, hard to evaluate a claim of having that come from a lifetime of intense involvement with provided insight to a wide audience. Even invitations real-world decisions. Yet, we set minimalist problems to speak and citations in the national press are but before subjects and expect them to resist the temptacircumstantial evidence. Psychology may be no more tion to impute a context. We may also be victims of a than a convenient place holder, showing that the public ''curse of cleverness'': We pride ourselves on devising has been represented, even if the details of its concerns just the right tasks for evaluating competing theories are ignored. A somewhat more direct, but still ambiguof human behavior, tasks that our predecessors were ous contribution is to provide components of larger prounable to concoct. Then, we expect subjects immedigrams. For example, we developed a set of open-ended ately to discern the structure of these tasks and decide procedures to describe and improve people's ''mental what response is right for them. models'' of environmental hazards (Bostrom, Fisch- The studies reported here ''turn subjects loose '' hoff, & Morgan, 1992; . It has inwithin (something like) the domains that more strucfluenced the design of two science museum exhibits on tured studies hope to illuminate. If subjects behave climate change and the re-design of EPA's Citizen's similarly when less constrained, there is added reason Guide to Radon. We used it to design a brochure on the for confidence in existing results. If subjects behave health effects of electromagnetic fields, over 100,000 differently or interpret tasks in unexpected ways, addicopies of which we have sold (at cost) (Morgan, 1989) .
tional experimental controls may be needed in order to A large chemical company has incorporated elements obtain the desired standardization. Although troubling of this approach in its communications, extending it in the short run, such problems may open opportunities to topics like corporate restructuring. However, even for new structured tasks, studying the unexpected bethough we designed our procedures for practicality, our haviors systematically. Assuming that these phenomcolleagues in the company had to improvise extensively ena can be domesticated as part of experimental sciin order to use them. What they could use fairly directly ence, open-ended approaches can be one element in was our articulation of a philosophy promoting an open the anarchic process by which its intellectual capital attitude toward their audiences (Fischhoff, 1995) . In is created (Feyerabend, 1975) . Subjects in these tasks each case, though, our research was but one piece of a might be compared to free-range chickens, relative to larger process, whose overall impact is poorly documented.
the battery-raised hens of experimental tasks. None- Camerer, C. (1981) . General conditions for the success of bootstraptheless, even these studies are a long way from real- Choosing research strategies is a gamble with a Cohen, J., Chesnick, E. I., & Haran, D. (1971) . Evaluation of compoorly structured option space. Narrowing the focus of pound probabilities in sequential choice. Nature, 32, 414-416. tasks reduces one's ability to identify surprising phe- Dawes, R. M. (1988) . Rational choice in an uncertain world. San nomena, while increasing one's ability to make science off by real-world problems. Although practitioners may Elkind, D. (1967) . Egocentrism in adolescence. Child Development, misdiagnose their situation, there is often something 38, 1025-1034. to be understood when they perceive a problem. Doing Ericsson, A., & Simon, H. A. (1984) . Verbal reports as data. Cama little applied basic research along the way may be a bridge, MA: MIT Press.
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